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Abstract 
We examine a new approach to modeling uncer­
tainty based on plausibility measures, where a 
plausibility measure just associates with an event 
its plausibility, an element is some partially or­
dered set. This approach is easily seen to gener­
alize other approaches to modeling uncertainty, 
such as probability measures, belief functions, 
and possibility measures. The lack of structure 
in a plausibility measure makes it easy for us to 
add structure on an "as needed" basis, letting us 
examine what is required to ensure that a plausi­
bility measure has certain properties of interest. 
This gives us insight into the essential features 
of the properties in question, while allowing us 
to prove general results that apply to many ap­
proaches to reasoning about uncertainty. Plau­
sibility measures have already proved useful in 
analyzing default reasoning. In this paper, we 
examine their "algebraic properties", analogues 
to the use of+ and x in probability theory. An 
understanding of such properties will be essential 
if plausibility measures are to be used in practice 
as a representation tool. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
We must reason and act in an uncertain world. There may 
be uncertainty about the state of the world, uncertainty 
about the effects of our actions, and uncertainty about other 
agents' actions. The standard approach to modeling uncer­
tainty is probability theory. In recent years, researchers, 
motivated by varying concerns including a dissatisfaction 
with some of the axioms of probability and a desire to 
represent information more qualitatively, have introduced 
a number of generalizations and alternatives to probability, 
such as Dempster-Shafer belief functions [Shafer 1976], 
possibility measures [Dubois and Prade 1990], and qualita­
tive probability [Fine 1973]. Our aim is to examine what is 
perhaps the most general approach possible to representing 
uncertainty, which we call a plausibility measure. A plausi­
bility measure associates with a set its plausibility, which is 
just an element in a partially ordered space. Every system-
Joseph Y. Halpern 
IBM Almaden Research Center 
650 Harry Road 
San Jose, CA 95120-6099 
halpem@almaden.ibm.com 
atic approach for dealing with uncertainty that we are aware 
of can be viewed as a plausibility measure. Given how little 
structure we have required of a plausibility measure, this is 
perhaps not surprising. 
As we shall show, this lack of structure turns out to be a 
significant advantage of plausibility measures. By adding 
structure on an "as needed" basis, we are able to understand 
what is required to ensure that a plausibility measure has 
certain properties of interest. This gives us insight into 
the essential features of the properties in question while 
allowing us to prove general results that apply to many 
approaches to reasoning about uncertainty. For example, in 
[Friedman and Halpern 1995a] we examine a necessary and 
sufficient condition for getting the KLM properties [Kraus 
et al. 1990] for defaults. Once we identify this condition, 
it is quite easy to show why many different approaches 
(such as preferential structures [Kraus et al. 1990], K­
rankings [Spohn 1987; Goldszmidt and Pearl 1992], and 
possibility measures [Benferhat et al. 1992]) all satisfy 
the KLM properties. Moreover, we also describe a weak 
necessary and sufficient condition for the KLM properties 
to be complete. This condition is easily seen to hold in 
all of these approaches. These results help us understand 
why the KLM properties characterize default reasoning in 
several different approaches. 
In this paper, we move beyond the realm of qualitative and 
default reasoning, and take a more general look at plau­
sibility measures. If plausibility measures are to be used 
as a tool for representing uncertainty, then we shall need 
to be able to emulate some aspects of probabilistic reason­
ing, such as reasoning by cases and the ability to condition. 
For example, a standard approach to computing Pr( A) is 
to write it as Pr(A IBt ) Pr(Bt) + · · · + Pr(AIBn) Pr(Bn) , 
where Bt, ... , Bn is a partition of the space. Other tech­
niques for representing uncertainty, such as �t-rankings and 
possibility measures, support similar reasoning. We exam­
ine what properties a plausibility measure must satisfy to 
allow us to carry out such reasoning. We provide construc­
tions that will be useful for any user of plausibility, show­
ing, for example, how we can start with an unconditional 
plausibility measure and construct a conditional plausibility 
measure with attractive properties. We also examine what 
properties of conditional plausibility are required to capture 
a plausibilistic analogue of Bayesian networks. Recently, 
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Darwiche and Ginsberg [Darwiche and Ginsberg 1992; Dar­
wiche 1992] and Weydert [ 1994] have proposed "abstract" 
formalisms with somewhat similar aims; we show how 
plausibility measures provide some advantages over both 
of these approaches. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 
we describe plausibility measures. We investigate their 
algebraic properties in Section 3, and apply these results in 
Section 4 to reasoning about independence and qualitative 
reasoning. We conclude with some discussion in Section 5. 
2 PLAUSIBILITY MEASURES 
A probability space is a tuple (W, :F, Pr), where W is a 
set of worlds, :F is an algebra of measurable subsets of 
W (that is, a set of subsets closed under finite union and 
complementation to which we assign probability), and Pr 
is a probability measure, that is, a function mapping each 
set in :F to a number in (0 , I] satisfying the well-known 
Kolmogorov axioms (Pr(0) = 0, Pr(W) = 1, and Pr(A U 
B) = Pr(A) + Pr(B) if A and B are disjoint).1 
A plausibility space is a direct generalization of a proba­
bility space. We simply replace the probability measure Pr 
by a plausibility measure PI, which, rather than mapping 
sets in :F to numbers in (0 , I], maps them to elements in 
some arbitrary partially ordered set. We read PI( A) as "the 
plausibility of set A". If PI( A) � PI( B), then B is at least 
as plausible as A. Formally, a plausibility space is a tuple 
S = (W, :F, D, PI), where W is a set of worlds, :F is an al­
gebra of subsets of W, D is a domain of plausibility values 
partially ordered by a relation �D (so that �D is reflexive, 
transitive, and anti-symmetric), and PI maps the sets in :F 
to D. We assume that D is pointed: that is, it contains two 
special elements T D and .ln such that .ln <n d <n T D 
for all d E D; we further assume that PI(W) = T D and 
PI(0) =.ln. As usual, we define the ordering <n by taking 
dt <n d2 if dt �D d2 and dt # d2. We omit the subscript 
D from �D. <n. T n. and .ln whenever it is clear from 
context. 
Some brief remarks on the definition: The algebra :F does 
not play a significant role in this paper. We have chosen to 
allow the generality of having an algebra of measurable sets 
to make it clear that plausibility spaces generalize probabil­
ity spaces. For ease of exposition, we omit the :F from here 
on in, always taking it to be 2 w, and just denote a plausibil­
ity space as (W, D, PI). In some applications we also do not 
care about the domain D. All that matters is the ordering 
induced by �D on the subsets in :F (see for example [Fried­
man and Halpern 1995a; Friedman et al. 1995]). However, 
in dealing with conditional plausibility the domain D plays 
a more significant role. 
So far, the only assumption we have made about plausibility 
is that � is a partial order. We make one further assumption: 
1 Frequently it is also assumed that Pr satisfies countable addi­
tivity, i.e., if A,, i > 0, are pairwise disjoint, then Pr(U, A,) = 
L, Pr(A,). We defer a discussion of countable additivity to the 
full paper. 
Al. If A � B, then PI( A) � PI( B). 
Thus, a set must be at least as plausible as any of its subsets. 
While this assumption holds for all the standard approaches 
to reasoning about uncertainty, we note that there are inter­
esting applications where this might not apply. For exam­
ple, if we take PI(A) to denote how "happy" an agent is if all 
he knows is that the true world is some world in A, then one 
could well imagine that A I might not hold. Knowing that 
the true world is w might be viewed as better than knowing 
that it is one of w and w'. For another example, suppose 
that we take PI(A) to denote the desirability of being in a 
situation where one needs to choose among elements of A. 
It is well known in the literature on choice theory that agents 
may occasionally view having more options as a worse situ­
ation, not a better one [Kreps 1988]. Despite these caveats, 
we shall assume A I for the remainder of the paper. 
Clearly plausibility spaces generalize probability spaces. 
We now briefly discuss a few other notions of uncertainty 
that they generalize: 
• A belief function Bel on W is a function Bel : 2 w -t 
(0 , 1] satisfying certain axioms [Shafer 1976]. These 
axioms certainly imply property A1, so a belief func­
tion is a plausibility measure. 
• A fuzzy measure (or a Sugeno measure) f on W 
[Wang and Klir 1992] is a function f : 2w 1-+ (0 , 1], 
that satisfies A 1 and some continuity constraints. A 
possibility measure [Dubois and Prade 1990] Poss 
is a fuzzy measure with the additional property that 
Poss(A) = supwEA (Poss( { w} ). 
• An ordinal ranking (or K-ranking) on W (as defined 
by [Goldszmidt and Pearl 1992], based on ideas that 
go back to [Spohn 1987]) is a function"' : 2 w --+ IN*, 
where IN* = IN U { oo }, such that �t(W) = 0, �t( 0) = 
oo, and K( A) = minaEA �t( {a}) if A # 0. Intuitively, 
an ordinal ranking assigns a degree of surprise to each 
subset of worlds in W, where 0 means unsurprising 
and higher numbers denote greater surprise. Again, 
it is easy to see that if "' is a ranking on W, then 
(W, IN* , "') is a plausibility space, where z �IN· y 
if and only if y � z under the usual ordering on the 
ordinals. 
• A preference ordering on W is a partial order � over 
W. Intuitively, w -< w' holds if w is preferred to w'. 
Preference orders have been used to provide semantics 
for conditional (or default) statements. In [Friedman 
and Halpern 1995a] we show how to map preference 
orders on W to plausibility measures on W in a way 
that preserves the ordering of events of the form { w} 
as well as the truth values of defaults (see Section 4.2 
for discussion). 
• A parametrized probability distribution (PPD) is a tu­
ple (W, {Pri : i 2: 0}) where each Pri is a probability 
measure over W. Such sequences of measures pro­
vide semantics for defaults in €-semantics [Pearl 1989; 
Goldszmidt et al. 1993]. In [Friedman and Halpern 
1995a] we show how to map PPDs into plausibility 
measures in a way that preserves the truth-values of 
defaults (again, see Section 4.2). 
• A qualitative probability space [Savage 1954; Fine 
1973] is a pair (W, �P), where �P is a total pre-order 
over 2w that satisfies several additional properties. 
Intuitively, �P is a qualitative representation of some 
probability space Pr such that A �P B if and only 
if Pr(A) � Pr(B). A similar notion of qualitative 
possibility spaces is discussed in [Dubois 1986]. It 
easy to verify that both are instances of plausibility 
spaces. 
For a plausibility measure PI with a domain D where sub­
traction makes sense, it is possible to define a dual notion 
Pld by taking Pld(A) = Pl(W) - Pl(A), where A is the 
complement of A. For example, the dual of a belief func­
tion is called a plausibility function [Shafer 1976] and the 
dual of a possibility measure is a necessity measure [Dubois 
and Prade 1990]; a probability distribution is its own dual. 
Note that these dual notions are also plausibility measures.2 
In general, a plausibility measure PI on W does not have a 
dual, although it does induce a dual ordering �d on subsets 
of W, where A �dB iff PI(A) � PI(B). 
Given the simplicity and generality of plausibility mea­
sures, we were not surprised to discover that Weber [1991] 
recently defined a notion of uncertainty measures, which 
is a slight generalization of plausibility measure (in that 
domains more general than algebras of sets are allowed), 
and that Greco [1987] defined a notion of £-fuzzy measures 
which is somewhat more restricted than plausibility mea­
sures in that the range D is a complete lattice. We expect 
that others have used variants of this notion as well, although 
we have not found any further references in the literature. 
To the best of our knowledge, no systematic investigation 
of plausibility measures of the type we are initiating here 
has been carried out before. 
3 ALGEBRAIC PROPERTIES 
In probability theory there is a functional connection­
captured by addition-between the probabilities of disjoint 
sets and the probability of their union. Similarly, there 
is a functional connection�aptured by multiplication­
between the conditional probability of A given B, the prob­
ability of B, and the probability of An B. These functional 
connections are frequently used in making probabilistic 
calculations. Not surprisingly perhaps, many approaches 
of handling uncertainty have analogues of addition and 
multiplication with similar roles. In particular, two recent 
"abstract" approaches to reasoning about uncertainty-that 
of Darwiche and Ginsberg [Darwiche and Ginsberg 1992; 
Darwiche 1992] and Weydert [1994]�onsider algebras of 
likelihood values that have some properties of probability, 
2 Although the word "plausibility" is used both in our notion 
of plausibility measure and in the Dempster-Shafer notion of a 
plausibility function, and plausibility functions are a special case 
of plausibility measures, there is no other connection between the 
two notions. There are simply not that many words that can be 
used to describe notions of uncertainty. We hope the overloading 
of "plausibility" will not cause confusion. 
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and allow operations analogous to addition and multiplica­
tion. As we now show, plausibility measures provide us 
with the tools to examine the assumptions on plausibility 
captured by assuming analogues to addition and multipli­
cation. Moreover, the appropriate application of these tools 
provides us with natural means of going from (uncondi­
tional) plausibility to conditional plausibility. 
3.1 DECOMPOSABLE MEASURES 
As we said above, probability theory postulates a functional 
connection between the probability of disjoint events and 
the probability of their union. Such an assumption can 
be viewed as providing a systematic basis for dealing with 
the combination of evidence, as well as providing a certain 
modularity in the description of probabilities. For example, 
if W is finite, a description of the probability of each world 
in W determinesPr(A) for any A� W. It is easy to impose 
a similar requirement on plausibility measures. Consider 
the following property: 
DECOMP. If A and Band disjoint, A' and B' are disjoint, 
PI(A) � PI(A'), and PI(B) � PI(B'), then PI(A U 
B) � PI( A' U B'). 
We say that a plausibility measure PI is decomposable if it 
satisfies DECOMP.3 As we now show, decomposability is 
enough to force there to be a function EB on D such that 
PI(A U B) = PI(A) Ef)PI(B) for disjoint sets A and B; we 
say that EB determines decomposition for PI. In fact, the 
axiom DECOMP= which results from replacing all occur­
rences of � in DECOMP by = is already enough to force 
there to be a function EB that determines decomposition for 
PI. DECOMP forces Ef)to have a few additional properties 
that make it even more like addition. 
Definition 3.1: Suppose D is a pointed ordered domain 
and o is a partial function mapping Dom( o) � D x D to D. 
If t, t' are two terms involving o, we write t =e t' if t = t' 
provided t and t' are both defined. (If one of t or t' is not 
defined, then t =e t' holds vacuously.) Similarly, we write 
t �e t' if t � t' provided both t and t' are defined. We say 
that o is 
• commutative if dt o dz =e dz o dt, 
• associative if (dt o dz) o d3 =e dt o (d2 o d3) 
• monotonic if dt � d3 and d2 � d4 implies dt o d2 �. 
d3 0 d4, 
• additive if do l..=e d, and d o T  =e T, 
• multiplicative if do l..=.l.. and d o T  =e d, 
• invertible if (dt,d2), (dt,d3) E Dom(E£)), dt od2 � 
d3 o d4, and dz � d4 >l.. implies dt � d3. 
3DECOMP is a weak variant of a property of qualitative proba­
bilities called disjoint unions in [Fine 1973, p. 17]. A similar prop­
erty has been examined in the theory of fuzzy measures [Dubois 
1986; Weber 199 1 ]. 
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Theorem 3.2: LetS = (W, D, PI) he a plausibility space. 
PI is decomposable if and only if there is a commuta­
tive, monotonic, additive function Ef;l on D with domain 
Dom(ij;)) = { (d, d') : 3 A , A' � W, An A' = 0, PI( A) = 
d, PI( A') = d'} that determines decomposition for PI such 
that: 
• Ef;l is associative on representations of disjoint sets, 
i.e., (d, Ef;ld2) ij;)d3 = d, Ef;l (d2 Ef;ld3) if there exist 
pairwise disjoint sets A,, A2; A3 such that Pl(Ai) = 
di, i = 1' 2 ,  3. 
Notice that the theorem does not say that Ef;l is associa­
tive. We show by example in the full paper that, in general, 
it is not.4 Interestingly, Fine [ 1973, p. 22] claimed that 
associativity of Ef;l in his framework follows from the as­
sociativity of U. This claim is not correct, although since 
there are differences between our assumptions and his, our 
counterexample does not apply to his framework. It is an 
open question whether associativity holds in his framework 
or not.5 We could, of course, define a (somewhat ugly) 
condition that would force $to be associative in general. 
We suspect that this will not be necessary in practice. 
Probability measures are decomposable, with decomposi­
tion determined by +. Similarly, possibility measures and 
x:-rankings are decomposable with decomposition deter­
mined by max and min, respectively. The embeddings 
of preferential structures and €-semantics into plausibility 
structures described in [Friedman and Halpern 1995a] also 
lead to decomposable plausibility measures. On the other 
hand, Dempster-Shafer belief functions are not in general 
decomposable. This follows from the following general 
observation: 
Lemma 3.3: If (W, D, PI) is a decomposable plausibility 
space and A and B are disjoint subsets of W such that 
PI( A) =PI( B) = l_, then Pl(A U B) = l_. 
Proof: SupposePI( A) = Pl(B) = l_. SinceP1(0) = _l,by 
DECOMP we have PI(A U B)= Pl(A u 0) = Pl(A) = l_. 
I 
Since it is easy to define a belief function Bel such that 
Bel( A) = Bel( B) = 0 for two disjoint sets A and B, while 
Bel( A U B) = 1, it follows that belief functions are not 
decomposable. A similar argument can be used to show 
that necessity measures, the duals of possibility measures, 
are not decomposable in general. 
4That is, we show that there are four pairs of disjoint sets 
(A, B), (C, D), (E, F), (G, H) such that PI(A) = d1, PI( B)= 
d2, PI(C) = d3, PI(D) = PI(A U B)= d1 ffi d2, PI(E) = d2, 
PI(F) = d3, PI( G)= d1, PI(H) = PI(E U F)= d ffi dJ, but 
PI( CUD) f. PI(GUH). Thus, (d1 ffid2)ffid3 f. d1 ffi(d2Ei:)d3), 
although all tenns are defined. 
5 A similar incorrect claim appears in [Darwiche and Gins­
berg 1992, p. 623]. However, in [Darwiche 1992], associativity 
is claimed to hold only for "meaningful sums". This seems to 
correspond to the same restriction as in Theorem 3.2. 
In many cases, we may start with a plausibility defined just 
on the elements of W ,  not on all subsets of W .  For exam­
ple, this may be the case if we try to elicit from the user an 
ordering on the worlds in W ,  but do not elicit a comparison 
between sets of worlds. As the next theorem shows, we 
can then extend this to a decomposable plausibility mea­
sure determined by a total function Ef;l that is commutative, 
associative, additive, and monotonic. 
Definition 3.4: We say that the ordered domain D' extends 
the ordered domain D, denoted D !;;;; D', if D � D', 
l_D=l_D'• T D = T D'• and �Dis �D' restricted to D x D. 
I 
Theorem 3.5: Suppose that D is an ordered domain and 
pl : W -+ D. Then there is a decomposable plausi­
bility structure S = (W, D', PI) such that Pl extends pl 
(i.e., D � D' andPl({w}) = pl(w) forw E W)and de­
composition for PI is determined by a total function ij;)that is 
commutative, associative, additive, and monotonic. More­
over, S is the minimal decomposable extension ofpl, in that 
ifS' = (W, D', PI') andPl' is a decomposable measure that 
extends pi, then Pl(A) � Pl(B) implies Pl'(A) � PI'(B) 
for all subsets A, B � W. 
Thus, if we are given an arbitrary decomposable plausi­
bility space, then the function determining decomposition 
may not be associative (although it will still be associative 
in many cases of interest). However, if we are just given a 
plausibility on elements of W ,  we can construct a decom­
posable plausibility measure determined by a function that 
is associative. Moreover, the minimality of our construc­
tion ensures that it does not make unnecessary assumptions 
regarding the relative plausibility of sets of worlds. 
3.2 CONDITIONAL PLAUSIBILITY 
Conditioning plays a central role in probabilistic reasoning. 
Not surprisingly, we are interested in studying conditioning 
in the context of plausibility as well. Of particular interest 
will be the connection between the conditional plausibil­
ity of A given B, and the plausibilities of B and An B. 
Before we can study this relationship, we need to consider 
conditioning in plausibility structures more generally. 
Just as a conditional probability measure associates with 
each pair of sets A and B a number, usually denoted 
Pr(AIB), a conditional plausibility measure associates with 
pairs of sets a conditional plausibility. Formally, a condi­
tional plausibility space is a family { (W, D A ,  PIA) : A � 
W }  of plausibility spaces. We typically write Pl(BIA) 
rather than PIA(B) and Pl(A) rather than PI(AIW ). In 
keeping with standard practice in probability theory, we 
also sometimes write Pl(BIA, E) rather than Pl(BIA n E). 
Of course, we do not want the various PIA's to be arbitrary. 
Conditioning attempts to capture the intuition that when we 
learn A, the probability of sets disjoint from A becomes 
0, while the relative probability of subsets of A does not 
change. The following coherence condition guarantees that 
conditional plausibility spaces have the same property: 
Cl. Pl(BIA, E) � PI( CIA, E) if and only if PI( An 
BIE) �PI( A n  CIE). 
In probability theory, the unconditional probability de­
termines the conditional probability, via the relation 
Pr(AIB) = Pr(A n B)/Pr(B). This, of course, is not in 
general true in arbitrary plausibility measures. We can have 
two distinct conditional plausibility spaces {(W, D A, PIA) : 
A � W} and {(W, D�, PI�) : A � W} on the same space 
W that agree on the unconditional probability (i.e., Plw = 
PI�) and yet differ on their components. On the other hand, 
if all we care about is the ordering of plausibilities, these 
two conditional plausibility spaces must be essentially the 
same. To make this precise, we say that two plausibility 
spaces (W, D,PI) and (W, D',PI') are (order-)isomorphic 
if for any A, B � W ,  we have that Pl(A) �D PI(B) if and 
only ifPI'(A) �D' PI'(B). 
Proposition 3.6: Let {(W, DA, PIA) : A � W} and 
{(W, D�, PI�) : A � W} he two conditional plausibil­
ity spaces on W .  lfPiw and PI� are isomorphic, then PIA 
and PI� are isomorphic for all A � W. 
Given an (unconditional) plausibility space S 
(W, D, PI), we can find a conditional plausibility space 
extending S and satisfying Cl in a straightforward way: 
Consider {(W, D A, PIA) : A � W}, where D A is a dis­
joint copy of {d E D : d �D PI(A)} and PIA(B) is the 
element in DA that corresponds to PI(A n B). It is easy 
to see that this conditional plausibility space satisfies Cl. 
Note that since DA and DB are disjoint when A=/= B, we 
cannot compare PI( CIA) to Pl(DIB). In fact, it is easy to 
verify that this plausibility space is the minimal one that 
extends Sand satisfies Cl. 
In some applications, we want more than just Cl. We 
want there to be a function® such that Pl(A n BIC) = 
PI(AIB, C) @Pl(BIC), as there is for probability. Such a 
function @is said to determine conditioning/or PI. To study 
this functional connection (and, more generally, to allow 
us to compare Pl(BIA) to PI(B'IA') when A =/= A'), we 
consider standard conditional plausibility spaces, those for 
which there is some domain D such that for each A C W, 
either DA = {..lv} or DA �D. 
-
To force the existence of a function determining condition­
ing, we require: 
C2. If Pl(AIB, C) � PI(A'IB', C') and Pl(BIC) � 
Pl(B'IC'), then Pl(A n BIC) � PI(A' n B'IC'). 
Again, to get the functional dependency, we require only 
a weaker version of C2 denoted c2=, where all the �·s 
are replaced by =. Just as with DECOMP, the stronger 
C2 forces the function @ determining conditioning to be 
monotonic. 
Axiom C2 says that PI( A n  B) is determined by PI( AlB) 
and Pl(B); it does not follow thatPI(AIB) is determined by 
PI(AnB) andPI(B). To force this, we need to force@to be 
"invertible". Roughly speaking, we want a division operator 
� such that PI( AlB) = Pl(A n B) �PI( B). Of course, 
we expect that by increasing the numerator or decreasing 
the denominator of a fraction like Pl(A n B) �PI( B), we 
Plausibility Measures: A User's Guide 179 
get an answer that's at least as large. This motivates the 
following axiom: 
C3. If PI( A n  BIC) � PI( A' n B'IC') and Pl(BIC) ;::: 
Pl(B'IC') >..l, then PI{AIB, C)� Pl(A'IB', C'). 
Again, we get a weaker version of this axiom, denoted c3=, 
if we replace all the inequalities with =. 
Theorem 3.7: LetS = {(W, DA, PIA) : A � W} he a 
conditional plausibility space. PI satisfies Cl and C2 if 
and only if there exists a multiplicative, monotonic func­
tion @ with domain Dom( ®) = {( d, d') : 3A, B, C � 
W, PI(AIB, C) = d, PI(BIC) = d'} that determines con­
ditioning for PI such that: 
• @satisfies limited associativity: if there exist sets 
A, B, C, D such that dt = PI(AIB, C, D), d2 = 
Pl(BIC, D), andd3 = Pl(CID), then (dt @d2)@d3 = 
dt @(d2 @d3).6 
PI additionally satisfies C3 if and only if@ is invertible. 
Of course, the standard definition of conditioning in prob­
ability satisfies C 1 -C3, and conditioning is determined by 
x. Similarly, the standard definition of conditioning in 
x:-rankings, which takes x:(AIB) = x:(A n B) - x:(B) 
[Spohn 1987], satisfies C 1-C3, with conditioning deter­
mined by addition. Finally, the standard notion of condi­
tioning in possibility measures [Dubois and Prade 1 990] 
which takes Poss(AIB) = 1 if Poss(A n B) = Poss(B) 
and Poss(AIB) = Poss(A n B) otherwise, satisfies Cl-C3, 
with conditioning determined by min. It may seem some­
what surprising here that min is invertible, as required by 
C3. After all, in general, min(dt, d3) = min(d2, d3) does 
not imply that d1 = d2. This implication does, however, 
hold in the domain of min in this case. We remark that 
we can take an alternate definition of conditioning in pos­
sibility theory, by defining Poss(AIB) = 0 ifPoss(B) = 0 
and Poss(AIB) = Poss(A n B)/Poss(B) otherwise. This 
definition also satisfies C1-C3, with conditioning being 
determined by multiplication. We shall contrast the two 
definitions in the next section. 
Note that our theorem does not force@ to be commutative. 
It is easy to state conditions that force additional properties 
of@, such as commutativity (see [Fine 1973]). 
What happens when we add the requirement of decompos­
ability to conditional plausibility measures? There are actu­
ally two ways to do this. We say that a conditional plausibil­
ity measure is locally decomposable if every PIA is decom­
posable. This requirement ensures that for each A, there is a 
function EElA such thatPI(BUCIA) = PI(BIA)EEJAPI(CIA) 
whenever B and C are disjoint. This condition, however, 
61n the full paper we show by example that (8) is not associative 
in general. We remark that Fine [1973, p. 30] and Darwiche and 
Ginsberg [ 1992, p. 625] again incorrectly claimed that similar 
assumptions forced (8) to be associative on all of Dom( (8)), and not 
just on triples (dt, d2, d3) of this special form. Moreover, in this 
case, the example we provide is a counterexample to associativity 
also in Fine's framework. 
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does not relate EEl A to E98, i.e., the combination of disjoint 
events depends on the evidence. We say that conditional 
plausibility measure is globally decomposable (or just de­
composable) if it satisfies the following property: 
DECOMPc. If A and B and disjoint, A' and B' are 
disjoint, Pl(AIC) � Pl(A'IC'), and Pl(BIC) � 
Pl(B'IC'), then PI( AU BIG)� PI( A' U B'IC'). 
It is easy to state and prove an analogous result to Theo­
rem 3.2, i.e., that a conditional plausibility space is globally 
decomposable if and only if there is a commutative, mono­
tonic, and additive function E9 such that for disjoint sets A 
and B, we have PI( AU BIG)= Pl(AIC) ffiPl(BIC). 
It is not immediately clear that we can find an invertible con­
ditional plausibility extending every (unconditional) plausi­
bility measure. As the next result shows, we can. Moreover, 
there is a unique minimal algebraic conditional plausibility 
measure, and it has some very nice properties. 
Theorem 3.8: LetS = (W, D, PI) be a plausibility space. 
Then there is a conditional plausibility space So = 
{(W, Do, PIA) : A � W} extending S (i.e., D !; Do 
and Plw = PI) in which conditioning is determined by a 
total function ®which is commutative, associative, mul­
tiplicative, invertible, and monotonic.1 Moreover, if S is 
decomposable, then so is So; in fact, there is a total func­
tion E9 that is commutative, additive, and monotonic that 
determines decomposition, and ®distributes over EB. In 
addition, if there is an associative function that determines 
decomposition for PI, then E9 is associative as well. 
The construction of Theorem 3.8 tells us that for any plau­
sibility measure PI we can find a "nice" (i.e., multiplica­
tive and invertible) conditional plausibility that extends it. 
Moreover, there is a conditional plausibility measure ex­
tending PI in which the functions determining conditioning 
and decomposition are total, and have desirable properties 
including commutativity and associativity of ®. and dis­
tributivity of ® over EB. As we show in the full paper, 
these properties are not necessarily implied by Cl-C3 and 
DECOMP c alone. When combined with our construction in 
Theorem 3.5, this gives us a way of starting with a plausibil­
ity measure on worlds in W, and extending to a conditional 
plausibility measure with these attractive properties. 
The conditional plausibility measure constructed in The­
orem 3.8 is in a precise sense the minimal one with all 
the required properties. If we start with an unconditional 
probability measure, K ranking, or possibility measure, the 
standard approaches to conditioning do not in general give 
us the conditional measure defined by this construction. 
Thus, they makes some comparisons between conditional 
plausibilities that are not forced by our requirements. Inter­
estingly, if we consider the standard approach to condition­
ing in possibility measures defined earlier (with ®being 
min), it cannot be extended to a total commutative function. 
7Note that the fact that (8) satisfies these conditions guarantees 
that So satisfies C2 and C3. 
Example 3.9: Suppose we have a possibility measure Poss 
on a space W and sets A � B � C such that Poss(A) = 
1/4, Poss(B) = 1/2, and Poss(C) = 3/4. (It is easy to 
find such a possibility measure.) Then, according to the 
definitions, we have Poss(AIB, C) = Poss(AIC) = 1/4, 
Poss(BIC) = 1/2. and Poss(BIA, C) = 1. Hence, 
min(Poss(BIA, C), Poss(AIC)) = 
min(Poss(AIB, C), Poss(BIC)) = 1/4. but Poss(AIB) =ft 
Poss(C). More abstractly, we have dt ®d2 = d2 (8)d3, but 
dt =ft d3. On the other hand, if ®could be extended to a 
total, commutative, invertible function, we would have to 
have dt = d3. We return to this issue in the next section. I 
3.3 COMPARISON TO OTHER ALGEBRAIC 
APPROACHES 
We now briefly compare our approach to others in the liter­
ature. 
Darwiche and Ginsberg's [1992] approach is somewhat 
similar to ours. They start with functions (which they call 
states of belief) that map formulas to an (unordered) set 
of plausibility values. To relate these to plausibility mea­
sures, we can take W to be the set of all truth assignments, 
and identify a formula with the set of worlds that satisfy it. 
Darwiche and Ginsberg then describe various assumptions 
that force the existence of what, in our terminology, are 
functions E9 and ®that essentially determine decomposi­
tion and conditioning. They then define an ordering �EEl on 
plausibilities in terms of Elf. z �EEl y if there is a z such that 
:z: ffiz = y. Their assumptions do not force their analogues 
of E9 and ®to be total (although they are total in all the 
examples provided). 
Notice that Darwiche and Ginsberg assume that originally 
we have a mapping from worlds to an unordered set of 
plausibility values. They then impose an ordering on this 
set. Their construction does not deal so well with the type 
of situation discussed before Theorem 3.5, where we start 
with a function pi that assigns to each world a plausibility in 
some ordered set; there is no way to take into account this 
initial ordering in their construction. For example, suppose 
W = {a, b} and pi( a) > pl(b). Their construction would 
make a and b incomparable according to �EEl· since there 
is no c such that b E9 c = a. In particular, this means that 
the Darwiche-Ginsberg approach cannot deal with initial 
preferential orders, which arise in default reasoning (see 
Section 4.2). 
Weydert [ 1994] starts with total functions E9 and ®on some 
set W ,  where E9 is commutative, associative, additive, and 
monotonic, while ® is commutative, associative, multi­
plicative, invertible, and monotonic. (Indeed, he requires 
even more of E9 and ®. although it is beyond the scope 
of the paper to explain these requirements.) Moreover, he 
also assumes a totally ordered domain D of plausibilities. 
He then define plausibility measures (quasi-measures in 
his terminology) as functions from W to D such that E9 
determines decomposition and ®determines conditioning. 
Our discussion above shows that quasi-measures cannot 
capture conditional possibility measures, since these can­
not be embedded in a total algebra. Similarly, they cannot 
capture belief functions, since these are not decomposable, 
nor preferential structures, since these are not totally or­
dered. Thus, Weydert's framework is not general enough 
to deal with many of the examples of interest to us. 
4 APPLICATIONS 
In this section, we discuss two possible applications of 
plausibility: reasoning about independence and qualitative 
reasoning. 
4.1 INDEPENDENCE 
The notion of independence plays a critical role in reason­
ing about uncertainty. Intuitively an event A is independent 
of B given C, if, once we know C, evidence regarding B 
does not provide us information about A. In probability 
theory, we say that A and B are independent given C if 
Pr(AIC) = Pr(AIB 1\ C). It is easy to see that this is equiv­
alent to Pr(AABIC) = Pr(AIC) x Pr(BIC). Once we con­
sider formalisms other than probability theory, there are a 
number of alternative definitions of independence that have 
been considered in the literature; see, for example, [Fine 
1973; Goldszmidt and Pearl 1992; Dubios et al. 1994]. We 
do not consider all the alternatives in our discussion of in­
dependence in the context of plausibility structures. Rather, 
we focus on one possible definition-perhaps the most ob­
vious generalization of the probabilistic definition-and a 
more qualitative variant of it. 
Suppose A, B, C � W. We say that PI makes A (plau­
sibilistically) independent of B given C denoted PI � 
Ind,(A, BIG), ifPI(BnC) =_l_ orPI(AIC) = Pi(AIB, C). 
Thus, A is independent from B given C either if B is 
implausible or if conditioning on B does not change the 
plausibility of A. 
To what extent do properties of probabilistic independence 
carry over to this definition? That depends on what assump­
tions we make about the underlying plausibility measure. 
Once we consider multiplicative plausibility measures (so 
that it makes sense to use {8)), we can characterize plau­
sibilistic independence much as we did probabilistic inde­
pendence. 
Proposition 4.1: (a) If PI satisfies c2= and PI f= 
Ind,(A, BIG), then PI( A n BIG) = Pl(AIC) ® 
PI( BIG). 
(b) lfPi satisfies c2= and c3=' then Pl I= Jnd,(A, BIG) 
if and only if (Pi(A]C), Pl(BIC)) E Dom(Q9) and 
Pi(A n BIG) = PI(AIC) ®Pl(BIC). 
(c) If Pi satisfies DECOMP'';. A1 n Az = 0, PI f= 
lnd, (A1 , BIG), and PI I= Ind,(Az, BjC), then PI � 
Ind,(AJ U Az, BIG). 
Thus, if PI satisfies c2=, then when A and B are uncondi­
tionally independent (i.e., independent given W ), the plau­
sibility of A n  B is determined by PI( A) and PI( B). This 
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seems to be a fundamental property of independence, and 
allows us to modularize the description of Pl. Decompos­
ability gives us another important property of independence: 
it guarantees that Ind, is closed under disjoint union. 
In probability theory, independence is symmetric: if A 
is independent of B, then B is also independent of A. 
When is lnd, symmetric? Expanding the definition of Jnd,, 
we see that it is symmetric if whenever Pl(AIB, C) = 
Pl(AIC), then Pl(BIA, C) = PI( BIG). Now if PI satis­
fies c2=, then Pl(A n BIG) can be expanded in two ways: 
Pl(AIB, C) Q9Pl(BIC) and Pl(BIA, C) ®Pl(AIC). Thus, 
we would expect Jnd, to be symmetric whenever ®is in­
vertible. This may not follow if ® is not total and com­
mutative. To see this, consider Example 3.9 again. The 
function min is invertible-C3 holds for conditional possi­
bility where conditioning is determined by min-yet, in that 
example, we have/nd, (A, BIG), but not lnd, (B, AI C). To 
get symmetry, we actually need the following variant of 
c3=: 
c4=. IfPI(A n BIG) = PI(A' n B'IC') and Pi(A!C) = 
PI(A'IB', C') >l_, then Pi(A!B, C)= Pi(A'IC'). 
Proposition 4.2: If PI satisfies c2= and C4=, then PI f= 
Ind,(A, BIG) if and only ifPi � Ind,(B, AIC). 
We note that C4 = is satisfied by the conditional plausibility 
measure So constructed in Proposition 3.8, as well as by 
probability theory and ��:-ranking. As Example 3.9 shows, it 
is not satisfied by conditional possibility with conditioning 
determined by min, although it is satisfied by conditional 
possibility with conditioning determined by multiplication. 
What we are often interested in is not just the indepen­
dence of one event (set) from another, but independence 
among a family of events. Given a set A = {AI, ... , A�:} 
of events, define an atom over A to be an event of the 
form A� n ... n A�, where A� is either A�: or its com­
plement A�:. Given three sets of events A, B, and C, we 
say that PI makes A strongly independent of B given C, 
denoted PI f= IND, (A , BI C), if, for all atoms X over A, 
all atoms Y over B, and all atoms Z over C, we have 
PI f= Ind,(X, YjZ). We remark that although this defini­
tion focuses on atoms, by part (c) of Proposition 4.2, we 
can extend these independence assertions about atoms to 
independence assertions about arbitrary sets in decompos­
able structures. Notice that if A is the singleton {A}, B is 
the singleton {B}, and C is the singleton {C} and we are 
dealing with a plausibility measure that is in fact a proba­
bility function, then this definition amounts to saying that 
A is (probabilistically) independent of B given both C and 
c.s 
Once we consider sets of events in this way, we can consider 
8This definition of independence is related to independence 
among random-variables [Pearl 1988]. Essentially, we are treat­
ing each event A as a two-valued random variable that has value 1 
in all worlds w E A and value 0 in worlds w fl. A. The following 
discussion can be easily extended to deal with many-valued ran­
dom variables. Because of space constraints we defer that to the 
full version of the paper. 
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the semi-graphoid properties [Pearl 1988]: 
Gl. IND,( A ,  BIC) implies/ND,(B, A jC). 
G2. IND,( A ,  B U DjC) implies IND,( A ,  BjC). 
G3. IND,( A ,  B U DjC) implies IND,( A ,  BIC U D). 
G4. IND,( A ,  BjC) and IND,( A ,  DjC U B) implies 
IND,( A ,  B U D IC). 
These properties are well-known to hold for probabilistic 
independence [Pearl 1988]. They also hold in the minimal 
decomposable conditional plausibility measures of Propo­
sition 3.8. In fact, we can prove a somewhat stronger result. 
Theorem 4.3: If PI is a conditional plausibility measure 
satisfying c2=. C4=, and DECOMP';, then IND, satisfies 
the semi-graphoid properties in Pl. 
This result is somewhat similar to one of Wilson [ 1994], and 
shows that we need relatively little to get a non-probabilistic 
notion of independence that obeys all the semi-graphoid 
axioms. 
It is known that any collection of independence statements 
that satisfy the semi-graphoid properties can be represented 
using a Bayesian network [Pearl 1988]. As we just saw, 
it takes fairly little to get a notion of plausibilistic inde­
pendence that obeys all the semi-graphoid properties. Dar­
wiche [ 1992] shows how to construct Bayesian networks 
in the framework of [Darwiche and Ginsberg 1992]. As 
we observed, this framework embodies additional assump­
tions beyond Cl,  c2=, C4=, and DECOMP=. While this c 
extra structure, particularly properties like invertibility and 
commutativity, may not be necessary to define Bayesian 
networks, Darwiche's results suggest that they may be use­
ful in facilitating analogues of probabilistic algorithms for 
updating beliefs in Bayesian networks. Whether this struc­
ture really is necessary is an issue that deserves further 
exploration. 
We now tum to a more qualitative notion of independence. 
If A is strongly independent of B given C, then discovering 
that some atom over B holds does not change the plausi­
bility of atoms over A. If all we care about is the relative 
plausibility of events, then we can consider a weaker notion, 
where discovering that some atom over B holds does not 
change the relative plausibility of atoms over A. Thus, we 
say PI makes A weakly independent of B given C, denoted 
PI F= Indw(A ,  BIG), if either Pl(B n C) =1.. or for all 
�toms X and X' over A, we have Pl(XIC) � Pl(X'IC) 
tf and only if Pl(XIB n C) � PI(X'IB n C). We say 
PI makes A weakly independent of B given C, denoted 
PI F= INDw( A ,  BjC), if, for all atoms Y over Band all 
atoms Z over C, we have PI f= Indw(A , YIZ). It is easy 
to see that IND,(X, YjZ) implies INDw(X, YIZ), as the 
names suggest. There do not seem to be any straightforward 
conditions that force weak independence to obey the semi­
�raphoid properties. Nevertheless, as we shall see below, 
tt may be that weak independence has an important role to 
play in default reasoning. 
4.2 QUALITATIVE REASONING 
We briefly review some of the results on default reasoning 
from [Friedman and Halpern 1995a; Friedman et al. 1995], 
in light of the results of the previous sections. 
A default is a formula of the form <p--+1/J, where <p and 1/J 
are propositional formulas. Such a default is read "<p's are 
typically (or normally, or by default) 1/J's". For the discus­
sion here, we identify a formula <p with the set consisting of 
the worlds where <p is true; this allows us to work with sets 
rather than formulas. We then say that a default A--+ B is 
satisfied by a a plausibility measure PI if either Pl(A) =..L 
or PI(A n B) > Pl(A n B), i.e., either A is implausible 
and we accept the default vacuously, orB is more plausible 
than its complement given A. This semantics for defaults is 
identical to that given for possibility measures [Benferhat 
et al. 1992] and for ordinal ranking structures [Goldszmidt 
and Pearl 1992]. As shown in [Friedman and Halpern 
1995a], we can map other semantic structures used for giv­
ing semantics to defaults-including preferential structures 
[Kraus et al. 1990] and the parameterized probability dis­
tributions (PPDs) used in �:-semantics [Goldszmidt et al. 
1993]-to plausibility structures in such a way as to pre­
serve the semantics of defaults. 
Default reasoning in all these approaches is characterized 
by a collection of properties known as the KLM axioms 
[Kraus et al. 1990]. Our semantics for defaults does not 
guarantee that the KLM properties are satisfied. (In partic­
ular, they are not satisfied by probability measures.) What 
extra conditions do we have to place on plausibility mea­
sures to ensure that these properties are satisfied? In the 
presence of A l ,  the following axioms tum out to be all that 
we need 
A2. If A, B, and Care pairwise disjoint sets, PI(AU B) > 
PI(C), and PI(A U C) >PI( B), then PI( A) > PI(B U 
C). 
A3. If PI( A)= PI( B) =..L, then PI( AU B) =..L. 
In [Friedman and Halpern 1995a] we prove that a plausibil­
ity measure satisfies all the KLM properties if and only if it 
satisfies A2 and A3. Thus, A2 and A3 capture the essence 
of the KLM properties. 
Since all the plausibility structures that arise from possibil­
ity measures, K:-rankings, preference structures, and PPDs, 
satisfy A2 and A3, this explains why the KLM properties 
hold in these approaches.9 Moreover, as we said in the intro­
duction, in [Friedman and Halpern 1995a] we also describe 
a weak necessary and sufficient condition for the KLM prop­
erties to be complete. This condition is easily seen to hold 
in all of these approaches. These results help us understand 
why the KLM properties characterize default reasoning in 
several different approaches. Plausibility structures also 
give us the tools to show how these approaches all differ 
once we allow first-order defaults [Friedman et al. 1995]. 
While there is general agreement that the KLM proper-
9We immediately get A3, using Lemma 3.3, as a consequence 
of the decomposability of these approaches. 
ties are the "core" of default reasoning, there is also general 
agreement that they are too weak. For example suppose that 
a knowledge base contains only the defaultBird-+Fly. Us­
ing the KLM properties, we cannot derive Bird ARed -+Fly, 
since it is consistent with this knowledge base that red birds 
are exceptional. Yet, given that our knowledge base does 
not contain any information indicating that red birds are 
exceptional, we would like to infer that they are not. This 
problem has been dubbed the irrelevance problem, since 
we want our inference procedure to consider Red irrele­
vant to Bird-+Fly. A great deal of recent work on default 
reasoning (e.g., [Goldszmidt et al. 1 993; Goldszmidt and 
Pearl 1 992; Pearl 1 989]) has attempted to deal with the 
irrelevance problem. Roughly speaking, given a partic­
ular knowledge base, these approaches focus on a set of 
preferred structures that are determined by this particular 
knowledge base. Intuitively, these preferred structures sat­
isfy the knowledge base and some additional irrelevance 
properties that we want to view as true by default. 
The results of the previous sections that plausibility may 
provide us with a general approach for dealing with irrel­
evance. How can we capture irrelevance? Perhaps the 
simplest definition is the following: B is irrelevant to the 
default C--+ A according to PI if C n B--+ A is satisfied 
by PI if and only if C-+A is satisfied by PI. It is easy to 
verify that PI F= lndw( {A}, BJC) if and only if B is irrel­
evant to C--+ A according to Pl. Thus, the weak notion of 
independence corresponds directly to irrelevance in default 
reasoning. Since all that matters in the semantics of a de­
fault such as C-+A is the relative plausibility of the sets 
C n A and C n A, it is clear that we do not need the full 
power of strong independence here. 
We believe that by studying lndw in the context of default 
reasoning we can gain some insight into the irrelevance 
problem. For example, we can make precise approaches 
that make a maximal number of independence assumptions 
that are consistent with the knowledge base. We note that a 
similar suggestion is made by Dubois et. al. [ 1 994] using a 
slightly different notion of irrelevance. They say that B is 
irrelevant to C-+A if bothC-+A and CnB-+A hold. We 
believe that this condition is too strong, since it presupposes 
the acceptance of the default. We are currently exploring 
this issue further. 
Qualitative measures also appear in the investigation of be­
lief change. The problem here is how an agent should 
change his beliefs after making a (possibly surprising) ob­
servation. It turns out that we can use conditioning in 
plausibility measures to handle belief change. Roughly, 
we say that an agent believes A given evidence E if 
Pl(AJE) > Pl(AJE). If we want the agent's beliefs to 
be closed under conjunction-if the agent believes A and 
B, then he also believes A n  B-then we must limit our 
attention to qualitative plausibility measures. 
Independence also proves to be important in belief change. 
In [Friedman and Halpern 1 995b], we describe belief 
change in a system by putting a plausibility measure on 
histories or runs that describe how the system changes over 
time. When doing probabilistic reasoning about such sys-
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terns, in many cases it is reasonable to assume that a partic­
ular state transition is independent of when it occurs. This 
Markov assumption greatly simplifies reasoning about com­
plicated systems, and has been shown to be widely appli­
cable in practice. There is no difficulty stating the Markov 
assumption using plausibilistic notions of independence. 
Moreover, as shown in [Friedman and Halpern 1 995b], by 
combining the Markov assumption with qualitative plausi­
bility measures, we get a natural and powerful model of 
belief change. In this model, after making an observation, 
the agent may revise earlier beliefs, as is done by belief revi­
sion [Alchourr6n et al. 1 985], may consider it possible that 
his earlier beliefs were correct but the world has changed, 
as is done by belief update [Katsuno and Mendelzon 1 991 ], 
or take some combination of the two possibilities. 
5 DISCUSSION 
In this paper, we have attempted to provide an introduction 
to plausibility measures, with a focus on their algebraic 
structure. Among other things, we showed how starting 
with a plausibility on worlds, we can extend to a condi­
tional plausibility measure defined on arbitrary sets, where 
the plausibilities have many of the properties satisfied by 
probability. In particular, decomposition is determined by a 
total function ffiwith many of the key properties of addition, 
and conditioning is determined by a total function ®with 
many of the key properties of multiplication. Moreover, 
the independencies in this minimal conditional plausibil­
ity space satisfy the semi-graphoid conditions. Thus, we 
provide a construction that can generate a Bayesian net­
work from a preferential structure. We believe that this 
might have interesting implications in investigating the ir­
relevance problem in default reasoning. 
More generally, as we hope our results show, plausibility 
measures give us a general framework in which to study 
fundamental issues of reasoning about uncertainty. They 
allow us to compare various approaches, and extract the 
key features needed to enable certain types of reasoning to 
be carried out. Plausibilities measures have already proved 
their usefulness in the analysis of qualitative default reason­
ing. We expect that many other applications will be found 
in the future. 
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